- October 09, 2015
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A Columbia Business School case study on CalPERS has criticised the fund for being “opaquely transparent”, with a computation of investment expenses revealing the fund pays three-to-four times its peers in fees.
Written by Columbia professor of business Andrew Ang and Columbia CaseWorks fellow, Jeremy Abrams, Californian dreamin’: The mess at CalPERS examines the political, governance, staff and funding obstacles that the fund has faced.
One of the enduring aspects of the fund, according to Ang, is the lack of true transparency of reporting. While there is a lot of publicly available documentation, CalPERS does not report any meaningful numbers, he says. For example, the fund does not report a single management expense ratio (MER) figure.
“CalPERS does not directly report its expense ratios, or even its proportion of internally or externally managed funds,” the report says.
Ang and Abrams calculate total investment expenses by summarising investment expenses from several tables in the 2011 annual report, including the statement of changes in fiduciary net assets, schedule of fees and costs for private equity partners, schedule of fees and costs for absolute strategies program, and the schedule of commission and fees (see table).
According to the case study, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2011 CalPERS’ expense ratio was 1.7 per cent for internally managed funds, 1.6 per cent for externally managed funds and 1.7 per cent overall.
This is significantly greater than CalPERS’ peers globally.
Associated with transparency
A 2012 CEM Benchmarking study, which examined the organisational design of 19 of the world’s largest funds with average assets of $90 billion, found these funds spend an average of 46.2 basis points on external management, compared to 8.1 basis points on internal investment capabilities.
Ang, who describes the case study as “sad”, says not only is CalPERS paying significantly more than its peers in investment expenses, but because of its reporting it is difficult to see where value is added.
“The fund can start a reform process with transparency. They are transparent, everything is there, but they are opaquely transparent and need to report meaningful numbers,” he says. “For example, there is not one MER number recorded – the case study had to calculate both the total internal and external costs.”
Associated with transparency, Ang says, is the way the fund uses benchmarks.
“With more successful funds, the benchmarks are often simple, stable and easy to follow. They represent a
feasible alternative to the investment strategy in an indexed way, then you can see the added value.”
With CalPERS, he says, it is hard to see the costs and how much value is being added.
“For example, the fund has a huge cost for real estate but you can’t see what they’re spending it on,” he says.
“This is a clear symptom of management. You manage what you measure but you can’t see it directly at this fund. All this money is going out the door and you can’t see what it is for.”
The case study points to a number of political and governance issues the fund will need to overcome in order to position itself for success.
But on the investment side it also details the reactive nature of some of the decision-making, including the lack of a strict rebalancing policy before 2007.
Ang says lobbying for legislative change would be the best, but most difficult, way to make changes to the fund.
“It’s difficult because it requires political willingness, which is very difficult, but it could create something: a phoenix from the mess,” he says.
“But really working within the current structure of piecemeal reform is necessary. CalPERS could look to emulate best practice of funds within restrictive circumstances, for example, Alaska, which has done well on a shoestring budget.”
Ang, who will teach the case to his business class in the fall with an emphasis on the tremendous opportunities for change at the fund, says he deliberately didn’t speak with anyone at CalPERS “because I wouldn’t get approval”.
|Consultants and professional services||87,337|
|Cost of lending securities||44,631|
|Domestic fixed income||899,122||9,217||1.03%|
|Attorneys, custodian and others||76,643|
|– private equity||28,908,879||516,858||1.79%|
|– absolute return strategies||5,490,035||142,022||2.59%|
Source: “California Dreamin': The Mess at CalPERS”, Columbia CaseWorks
Collated from the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAR) 2011 and Annual Investment Report 2010 and 2011