Worldwide diversity in funded pension plans

There is a huge diversity in pension system design across the globe, reflecting historical, cultural and institutional diversity. There is much to be learned by each of the different systems, so in order to compare the benefits of various systems, two authors from APG in the Netherlands postulate a new classification of four role models of funded pension plans.

They thus provide an in-depth comparison of funded pension savings plans around the world.

The research by Eduard Ponds and Manuel Garcia-Huitron, funded by NETSPAR, proposes new classifications based on choice architecture and type of regulation, and the authors illustrate the features of each role model with 12 representative pension plan case studies from 11 countries.

“Valuable lessons can be learned from international best practices, but we avoid making any normative comparison,” the authors say.

The authors come up with four models: the centralised choice model, the delegated choice model, the regulated choice model, and the induced choice model.

They provide examples of various plans from different parts of the world and a matrix of positive and negative attributes for each category.

Sponsored Content

While they acknowledge “the search for an optimal pension system may be a futile exercise as each model has strong institutional and historical roots that are deeply wired into cultural attitudes towards freedom of choice, flexibility and the role of (and trust in) the state and the private sector,” the authors believe there are valuable lessons to be learned from the international experience.

 

The paper can be accessed below

Worldwide diversity in funded pension plans – four role models on choice and participation

 

 

Leave a Comment

GIC, Temasek eye trillions of growth in climate adaptation market

GIC, Temasek eye trillions of growth in climate adaptation market

Singapore’s two largest asset owners, GIC and Temasek, see attractive opportunities in climate adaptation solutions – a relatively underfunded area compared to decarbonisation. The former has already made selective adaptation investments and said the opportunity set across public and private debt and equity could increase to $9 trillion by 2050.

Sort content by

Fund manager contracts and financial markets’ short-termism

This paper investigates the extent to which the delegation of funds management prevents long-term information acquisition, inducing short-termism in financial markets. The authors, Catherine Casamatta and Sebastien Pouget also study the design of long-term fund managers’ compensation contracts. Under moral hazard, fund managers’ compensation optimally depends on both short-term and long-term fund performance. Short-term performance

Sovereign Development Funds: designing strategic investment institutions

The hunt for alpha is leading traditional investors toward more innovative strategies and operating models. And, significantly, one potential source of inspiration for long-term investors has come from an unconventional place: the community of sovereign development funds (SDFs). In this paper academics from Stanford University provide readers with analytical frameworks that can assist in the

Capitalising on institutional co-investment platforms

Co-investment is often perceived as referring to institutional investors investing alongside their external asset managers in companies, but increasingly it refers to investment responsibilities being shared among peer investors, as long-term institutional investors are forming co-investment partnerships with the specific objective of deploying capital collaboratively into attractive investment opportunities. These collaborative partnerships seem to be an

State pension funds tilt towards politically-connected stocks

It is well documented that local bias exists in US state pension fund holdings, but now an article in the Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming) finds evidence not only of local bias, but bias towards politically-connected stocks.  Not only that, but the article finds that political bias is detrimental to fund performance. “Political bias is

The power of knowledge management

Funds management is often discussed in the context of it being part art and part science, however most of the literature centres around the science, the finance, of funds management. The premise of active management is that skills and knowledge are paramount to capturing excess returns above the benchmark. But despite this premise, little is

Re-intermediating investment management

In this paper, Ashby Monk and Rajiv Sharma from the Global Projects Center at Stanford University, examine the balance of power among the various parties in the private assets investment food chain. They argue that fund managers have too much power, as do the consultants that act as gatekeepers to those managers. While the authors

Previous