The $37 billion Utah Retirement Systems (URS) has invested in private equity since 1983, yet that is the only asset class where the pension fund still doesn’t control manager selection.

Rather than go direct, strategy for the 9 per cent target allocation has focused on fund-of-funds investment via segregated accounts.

Now, in a bid to improve risk-return in its best-performing asset class, the fund is finally switching to picking its own managers in private equity, as it does across all other allocations.

This will involve reducing its manager roster and focusing on bigger investments in more concentrated portfolios. URS is still unsure about the number of key manager relationships it will whittle down to for private equity – which has returned 10.9 per cent for the fund over 10 years – but knows it has way too many now.

The switch demands a strong value proposition and branding for URS, especially in today’s market, where general partners (GPs) hold all the cards.

“Managers say, ‘I can take money from anywhere, so why should I take it from you?’ ” says URS chief investment officer Bruce Cundick, in a joint interview with deputy chief investment officer Jason Morrow. “We are going to lose in the fee game and in aligning interest if we can’t give them a value proposition.”

Luckily, URS is convinced it can.

Why it matters

Utah has invested in alternatives since the early 1980s, so it has a long tail of lessons it has learnt. This has taught Cundick, who has been at the fund since 2001, that success in the alternatives allocation depends greatly on implementation. The fund has 40 per cent across private equity, real assets and absolute return.

The bulk of the alternatives portfolio, including a chunky 16 per cent hedge fund allocation, is invested with GPs, although URS does have 60 per cent of its real estate and agriculture allocation managed in-house.

While success in public markets is linked to simply having exposure, in private markets, exposure to an asset class is no guarantee of success, Morrow continues.

“As dispersion increases, the ‘average’ or median experience can become less and less representative of anyone’s actual experience,”he says.

In short, success in alternatives involves much more than “just putting money in, like you can the S&P 500”, Cundick says.

It calls for expertise, risk systems, getting on planes and, most importantly, aligning interests with GPs, via that jostling negotiation between manager and investor that takes into account the value each party brings to the table.

 

Alignment in hedge funds

The fund views its history of maintaining long-standing manager relationships and a strong balance sheet as one of its key values.

“We are hesitant to do anything unless we can see a multi-year relationship,” explains Morrow, who draws on the hedge fund portfolio – structured to cater to URS’s ‘downside quick recovery’ model – to illustrate the mutual benefits of longevity in action.

The portfolio is designed not to compete with equity but to provide diversification and capital preservation, and to enhance the total return – although all three rarely come together. Its primary function is to ensure a quicker bounce-back than equity after market falls, Cundick says.

“After 2008, it took five years for equity markets to get back to their high-water mark, but it took our hedge funds 14 months,” Cundick recalls. “What we are interested in is how that hedge fund allocation performs in down markets and how quickly it recovers.”

He recently tested the entire current portfolio with a “2008 scenario” to measure how it would perform under similar circumstances today.

“We asked if our portfolio today [would fall less and recover more quickly] under 2008 circumstances, and the current scenario testing suggests it does,” he says.

The hedge fund portfolio runs on a beta of between 0.1 and 0.2, with a low volatility that means there is never enough risk or equity beta to compete with the equity allocation. In the hedge fund allocation, most of URS’s relationships now have multi-year incentive fees.

URS’s hedge funds felt the benefits of its sticky capital in the 2008 financial crisis, when the pension fund doubled down on a handful of struggling funds that were close to folding because they couldn’t meet liquidity calls as scared investors pulled out.

Eighteen months later, URS made a killing, but the real value of ploughing in that money has come from the pension fund’s reputation for having a strong balance sheet now. URS is one of the most sought-after LPs among hedge funds, giving a real edge when it comes to aligning interests and negotiating fees with about 30 managers, a number recently reduced from 50.

Now it’s time to play catch up in private equity.

Nimble governance

An ability to be nimble, thanks to the fund’s governance structure, is another trait they value. The seven-member board, staffed by professional investors, sets the asset allocation, actuarial rate of return and contribution rates, which employers are legally compelled to meet. The only politician on the board is the state treasurer and all implementation and manager selection is delegated to the investment teams; no board members sit on the three investment committees.

“We can move quickly,” Cundick says. This is evident in a process Morrow calls the fire drill, whereby URS is prepared to pre-commit to future capital calls with high-conviction managers when opportunities come up, bypassing two to eight weeks of underwriting.

Skin in the game

URS expects a few things in return. Primarily that managers invest their personal capital. Observing managers’ reactions to the fund’s insistence on this point is insightful, Cundick says.

“If a manager says it isn’t going to put money into a fund it’s trying to sell, it shows me that it’s not motivated enough to be on our side of the table and it’s better for us to walk away,” Cundick says.

Equally important is measuring the amount managers put in relative to their wealth.

“They may put in $10 million personally but that’s a drop in the bucket if they are a billionaire.”

The amount of skin a manager has in the game can also influence the amount of risk it’s prepared to take, Morrow notes.

URS’s manager due diligence involves in-depth qualitative research modelling new managers’ returns onto URS’s portfolio to analyse how that strategy will affect risk.

“We scenario-test every manager to see what they will contribute on a risk basis,” Cundick explains.

It’s part of a ‘risk first’ philosophy. The fund spends more time considering an asset’s risks than it does potential returns. URS risk budgets its entire portfolio and scenario-tests every month to determine correlations.

Alignment involves other areas, too, like insisting managers take on the duties that assure their good behaviour.

“We would struggle to understand how someone would outright refuse to be a fiduciary to the fund they manage,” Cundick says.

URS doesn’t invest in products with investment banks because of the potential conflict of interest and tends to steer clear of managers or funds with multiple products.

“We want that fund to be the only fund that the manager has,” Morrow says. “As soon as you have that kind of manager, you have more alignment of interest.”

The pension fund also prefers not to invest in organisations that include outside owners, because it is hard to see what drives decisions.

Finally, with regard to fees, negotiation hinges on meeting three basic principles.

“Is it fair? Is it well aligned? And how capable is the manager?” Morrow says.

He notes that the ability to negotiate fees is cyclical – ebbing and flowing with competition for assets – and that fees have become a much larger percentage of returns in a lower-return environment.

Morrow says the fund is prepared to pay high fees in funds where operating costs are high, if the objectives are still clearly aligned.

Co-investment, and other alternative private equity vehicles, underperform a manager’s associated main fund, a new paper by leading private equity academics Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar shows.

The paper, co-authored by Harvard’s Lerner, Schoar from MIT, and Nan Zhang and Jason Mao from State Street Global Exchange, examines the performance of alternative vehicles, such as direct investing and co-investments, for the first time.

The research found that, on average, co-investment private equity vehicles underperform a general partner’s (GP) main fund; however, there is a twist. The paper also found that limited partners (LP) with better past performance invest in alternative vehicles that have above-average market performance. In fact, the performance of co-investment vehicles for those investors outperforms even the GP’s main fund.

In other words, if you’re an investor with access to high-performing GPs, it’s worthwhile to invest in a co-investment vehicle. For everyone else, it’s not worth it.

“When comparing the performance of alternative vehicles to those of the main funds raised by the same private capital group in the same year (or in the five years prior), we see that on average the alternative vehicles underperform their associated main funds,” the paper, Investing Outside The Box, states.

In an interview with top1000funds.com, Lerner, who is the Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking at Harvard Business School, said the same funds that were good at choosing private equity funds (and managers) were also good at choosing alternative vehicles, and outperforming the associated main fund.

“Those that do it well show it’s worth doing,” Lerner says. “This supports early work that Antoinette and I did that highlighted that not all LPs are created equal.

“If you take the conclusions of this paper seriously, then doubling down on choosing the right funds to invest in is the winning strategy for investing in private equity, rather than investing in alternative vehicles”, with the exception of LPs that are proven to be very good fund-pickers.

The good news is Lerner’s observation that LPs often learn from their investments in private equity, resulting in improved performance.

“There is evidence that LPs have a general pattern of increasing performance over time,” he says. “Trial and error really matters. One thing that has impressed me about the leading LPs is their experience really comes to bear. A lot of it is pattern recognition and inference from stuff they have seen before and where the warning signs are.

“A lot of the LPs that are good often have people who have been in the industry for a while and worked together for a while so are good at the softer things. This is definitely an area where LPs can get better.”

The allocation to alternative vehicles has grown from 7 per cent of private equity capital commitments in the 1980s to 24 per cent in the 2010s.

Of the 108 investors in the research sample that allocated to private equity, only four did not use any alternative vehicles.

The paper also shows that investment in alternative vehicles could be the result of a bargaining process between a set of very different GPs and LPs.

Why it happens

Lerner says there are potentially several different stories as to why there is disparity in performance.

“When do GPs need help filling out their dance card? It’s usually in situations where they are putting a lot of money to work, so in big deals or at market peaks. I’ve said before, if an investor wants to be successful in private equity, avoiding the times where money is being put to work is a good strategy,” he says.

Lerner says it is also possible that investors are choosing alternative vehicles at the wrong time.

“Alternative vehicles might be the only thing an LP can get access to at a quantity they want,” he explains.

He also says perhaps the LPs view the GP as sufficiently good that the alternative vehicles are “good enough”, compared with other funds in which the LP could invest.

Another reason might be that the decision to employ co-investment is a portfolio management decision and discretionary deals are a way of getting a particular exposure.

Or maybe LPs just view doing direct deals as more interesting and intellectually challenging.

“We can say that most literature suggests private equity is not a cheap asset class so the desire of LPs to get a better deal is understandable,” Lerner says.

But there is a huge disparity of returns in private equity, so while an investor might be getting a discount, it could be on an investment that underperforms.

 

To access the paper click here: Investing Outside The Box

Other stories related to this research include:

Private equity persistence slips

Asset owners rethink private equity

 

 

 

 

The International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) is an independent international body representing entities involved in the supervision of private pension systems all over the world. We have 86 members and observers from 75 jurisdictions and territories worldwide. Our main goal is to improve the quality and effectiveness of the supervision of private pension systems throughout the world. This includes enhancing their development and operational efficiency and allowing for the provision of a secure source of retirement income in as many countries as possible.

As president of IOPS, I have found increasing interest in ESG matters from many of our members; indeed, a recent survey of members found ESG one of the issues where IOPS should set standards. Considering this, the IOPS is now developing draft guidelines on the application of ESG factors in the supervision of pension fund investment. The use of these guidelines is not be mandatory but we believe they will encourage pension funds in IOPS countries to incorporate these factors in their decision-making process in some way.

Why ESG is important

Recent data from Willis Tower Watson states that global pension funds manage more than $42 trillion. This gigantic pool of resources is mostly invested with a long-term horizon in companies, projects, vehicles and investment instruments all over the world. Pension funds’ main mission is unobjectionable: deliver the best portfolio profitability with an assumed risk level, according to their fiduciary responsibility; however, in recent years, this vision has gradually incorporated a more holistic view with regards to global wellness. “Responsible investment” recognises that, in addition to adequate profitability, there are several other factors that should be taken into consideration, such as ESG concerns.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that ESG factors are “indicators used to analyse the investment prospects of a company, [evaluating their performance based on] environmental, social, ethics and corporate governance criteria”. To incorporate ESG indicators, pension funds should identify environmental, social and governance risks related to the purpose of the company or project in which they intend to invest. Some examples are:

  • Environmental risks: physical risks caused by environmental change.
  • Transition risks: changes in policies, laws, markets, technology, investor’s feelings and prices.
  • Liability risks: legal or moral responsibility to cover financial losses caused by events environmental change has induced.
  • Social risks: related to working conditions, including slavery and child work, local communities, indigenous communities, conflicts, health problems and security
  • Governance risks: related to the remuneration of executives, bribes and corruption, political lobbying and donations, diversity and the board of director’s structure, fiscal strategy, etc.

Awareness of ESG factors in investment strategies is becoming more relevant; nevertheless, adoption is still in its early stages. Several international organisations are suggesting the adoption of such principals, including: the Principles for Responsible Investment; the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures; the new European Union directive, institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORP) II; and the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for the Ecologisation of the Financial System. Also, the OECD has published general guidelines about how investment funds can incorporate these factors.

Global Sustainable Investment Alliance data shows that $22.9 trillion of assets were professionally managed under responsible investment strategies in 2016, up from $13.3 trillion in 2012. This fast growth signals that all institutional investors are starting to incorporate, or at least consider, ESG factors in their investment decisions.

Because pension funds should be focused on long-term goals, according to a lifecycle approach, it is essential that pension fund providers or managers start considering structural long-term factors in their investment decisions, such as environmental and social conditions.

Here are the main reasons to invest in companies or projects that consider ESG factors:

  • Such companies seem to be associated with better long-term yields
  • They usually promote an improvement in the relationship between long-term risk and return
  • They have positive environmental and social effects on the country
  • ESG factors can be integrated into investment prospects without sacrificing diversification or returns

Returns

Empirical evidence seems to indicate a positive or neutral relationship between financial performance and the consideration of ESG factors. A meta-study published by the Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investmentin 2015 analysed the results of 2200 studies and showed that it’s worth considering ESG factors in investment strategies.

The report states that 90 per cent of the studies found a neutral or positive relationship, with variations by region, between financial performance and the inclusion of ESG factors. It seems natural that companies that follow governance best practices, such as having a board with real independent members, adequate equity structure and aligned incentives between managers and shareholders, would have a greater probability of getting a higher yield. Also, if companies take care of internal issues such as gender equality, diversity, water and environmental care, they will probably have better yields in the long term because these are characteristics associated with a well-managed company.

ESG factors have been gaining more relevance in the portfolio composition of institutional investors, including pension funds. The ESG global survey that BNP Paribas conducted in 2017 found that 79 per cent of global institutional investors now incorporate ESG factors. Among those who do, half invested nearly 25 per cent of their portfolios in specific strategies based on ESG criteria. That proportion is expected to increase to 50 per cent or more by 2019.

Carlos Ramirez Fuentes is IOPS president and president of Mexico’s National Commission of the Retirement Savings System (CONSAR).

As ridiculous as it sounds, fee-for-no-service is now a recognised thing in the Australian financial services sector. I can’t get my head around it. Fee. For no service.

The Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry was established in December last year and in the last two weeks the focus has been on the A$2.6 trillion ($1.9 trillion) superannuation sector – the fourth-largest pot of pension money in the world.

The maxim fee-for-no-service is one of the gems to come out of the commission so far. It would be funny if it weren’t so appalling.

The royal commission has focused on the internal workings of superannuation funds and, refreshingly, has shone a light on the industry, creating clarity around some pretty basic issues.

The first week of superannuation hearings at the royal commission focused heavily on issues related to fees and whether they had been inappropriately or illegally deducted from members’ accounts.

In Australia, there are a number of different types of superannuation funds, including not-for-profit industry funds, corporate funds and retail funds, the latter of which are largely provided by the big banks. The royal commission has revealed some of the behaviours and activities in those banks to be downright wrong and possibly criminal.

Consumers have been deliberately misled, members of funds have been charged for advice and services they didn’t receive, and in an absolutely outrageous and horrifying act, dead people have been charged for services on an ongoing basis.

National Australia Bank is one of the big offenders. An Australian Securities and Investments Commission report found the bank to have been incorrectly charging fees since 2004. At the royal commission hearings, NAB executives were questioned about more than 100 potentially criminal breaches of superannuation laws.

AMP and the four big banks – NAB, ANZ Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank and Westpac – have agreed to refund more than $219 million to superannuation and wealth customers due to fees-for-no-service, primarily as a result of charging ongoing advice fees but failing to provide any general or personal advice.

The bank-owned superannuation funds aren’t the only ones that have been behaving inappropriately.

There are 113 MySuper products in Australia – these are Australian Prudential Regulation Authority-regulated superannuation funds – and mergers of funds for scale and member benefits has been on the agenda for years. But the commission heard that mergers between superannuation funds have failed specifically because of self-interest: trustees and executives not wanting to merge because there may not be a job for them in the new regime. Further, the commission heard that trustees have not undergone skills-based assessments as part of their appointment process and have clearly not been putting the interests of members first.

In his 1976 book The Unseen Revolution: How pension fund socialism came to America, management expert Peter Drucker warned of the potential abuse of power around large pools of money. He said the real danger was that large pools of assets could be highjacked by four groups: business, organised labour, government and the financial services industry. The latter group has clearly taken liberties in Australia.

All players in the superannuation ‘value’ chain have the privilege of managing other people’s money. And in Australia, superannuation is compulsory. Every working Australian, and every employer, must contribute to superannuation. So not only are members of funds putting faith and trust in the hands of those managing their money, they must do so.

Australia’s Governance Institute Ethics Index was released this week and, perhaps not surprisingly, financial services was the lowest-rated industry in the survey, with 55 per cent of respondents viewing it as unethical.

The Australian financial services sector has some work to do. Well, let’s face it, it has a lot of work to do.

Commissioner Kenneth Hayne, a former justice of the High Court of Australia, will hand down his interim report on September 30.

For more detailed stories on the royal commission, visit our sister publication Investment Magazine

 

California Public Employees’ Retirement System investment staff are concerned with the level of equity risk in the portfolio. This week, they warned it was greatly exposed to equity downturns and said they would be closely monitoring and managing the active risk for the first time.

At the CalPERS investment committee meeting this week,outgoing chief investment officer Ted Eliopoulos said attribution analysis of the fund’s fiscal-year return of 8.6 per cent revealed the need to review the level of active risk throughout the portfolio.

He said the investment office had developed total fund data and governance architecture and the focus for the next two years would be decomposing the level of active risk taken within the various asset classes.

“We will be measuring active risk and coming to some conclusions about whether we are being rewarded for the active risk we are taking, and make some shifts within the portfolio to pursue programs and efforts where we are being rewarded for active risk taking and avoid those where we are not,” Eliopoulos said. “We can now isolate more specifically the investment decisions that are made in a given year, and it’s quite complex and complicated to do that.

With all the work we have done on the data and governance side, we are quite confident we can review the allocation decisions and sub-factor decisions that are made.”

Chief operating investment officer of the $335 billion CalPERS, Elisabeth Bourqui, said the next step in the active risk assessment would be to “construct agile decision-making” and to develop the ability to compare the different levels of active risk.

“Another great step is to construct a data strategy to be quite agile about our own understanding and overview,” Bourqui said. “This goes with different notions of risk that are being taken. One notion is the return and asset risk, but another part is to understand what this looks like from a funding ratio perspective and what active risks are contributing to that. We will put the active risks together with the funding ratio and come up with a way to measure the levels of active risks and how the funding ratio will evolve over time with that. Then, if needed, we can implement some measures on the active-risk side that would affect the downside of the funding ratio.”

CalPERS board president Priya Mathur espoused the move to review the active risk.

“I’m very glad we are going to be doing an active review of risk taking across the asset classes,” Mathur said.

 

Exposed to global equities

An assessment of CalPERS’ portfolio shows that the biggest risk for the fund is a severe drawdown in global equity markets. The average weight to public equities over the last five years has been 52 per cent, the allocation now sits at 48.4 per cent, and the fund also has a 7.7 per cent allocation to private equity.

The fund has a 55 per cent capital allocation to growth assets, placed in public and private equity, managing investment director, asset allocation/risk management, Eric Baggesen, said the risk contribution from those two asset classes represents almost 85 per cent.

The investment committee heard how exposed the portfolio was to drawdowns in global equity markets.

“With our current asset allocation, if the events of the early 2000s – the tech crash or the financial crisis – were replayed, we would be seeing drawdowns of $80 billion-100 billion,” Baggesen said. “There would be a fairly significant effect on the funding ratio if those events replayed themselves. The portfolio is exposed.”

It was estimated such a loss would leave the fund 50 per cent funded, down from its current position of 71 per cent.

Not only is equity risk the biggest for CalPERS, but also the fund’s equities exposure hasn’t added any value – actually detracting 19 basis points from the total portfolio in the year to June 30.

Not surprisingly, given the fund’s asset allocation, Baggesen showed that the portfolio is driven by growth assets and the fund’s performance is closely tied to the equity market.

The key return drivers of the portfolio over the year to June 2018 have been real assets, allocation management and fixed income. In the last year, both public and private equity have decreased returns, accounting for -19 basis points and -17 basis points, respectively.

Similarly, over five years, private equity has detracted 25 basis points from returns; with the drivers of return over this period being fixed income (13 basis points) and public equity (3 basis points).

While Bourqui said the portfolio’s underperformance of the benchmark by 6 basis points was acceptable, it was disappointing.

The loss was due to country positioning in emerging markets and an overweight position to value-tilted strategies in global equities.

“This meant, in the US, we were underweight the mega-cap tech stocks such as Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google.”

CalPERS manages its global equities portfolio using factor-based strategies, and Mathur said that while this approach to equities affected the portfolio in the short term, these strategies should be judged by measuring them over the long term.

“A factor-based approach to equities impacted the portfolio,” Mathur said. “But this is an approach we need to measure over the long term, and we don’t want to over-learn the one-year message. We don’t want to retract from our factor-based approach, which we think will serve us over a long period of time.”

Bourqui said the factor approach also allowed the fund to navigate the market and look at particular concentrations that it might want to avoid.

“The factor-based approach to diversify against market concentration is useful,” she said.

 

Asset allocation implications

Despite the concentration of risk in equities, and the fact the allocation hasn’t added value where it should, there doesn’t seem to be any discussion about changing the fund’s weighting to growth assets.

Baggesen said managing the risk of the portfolio centred on maintaining the equities exposure.

“In large measure, the management of the risk is to make sure we administer the fund in a way that allows us to try to maintain the large growth bet in any environment,” he said. “In 2008-09, we couldn’t continue the same risk profile of the fund.”

Eliopolous told the committee the return was within an acceptable range.

“The overall message is that this is appropriate risk and an acceptable result from a relative standpoint, but disappointing in terms of [being] below the benchmark, even if marginally,” he said. “What’s around the corner we don’t know, both macroeconomics and the markets are a domain of randomness and we don’t have a crystal ball for the future.”

 

CalPERS asset allocation   June 30, 2018     

Asset Portfolio allocation (%) Risk attribution – forecast contribution to volatility (%)
Public equity 48.8% 70.4%
Private equity 7.7 13
Income 22.5 2.3
Real assets 10.8 11
Liquidity 3.4 0
Inflation 5.9 2.7
Trust level 0.9 0.6

 

 

Less risky, but more profitable – it’s an alluring sales pitch and one that traditional financial theory says should make us suspicious. But it’s one that low-volatility equity strategies have delivered on, for the most part, over the last decade. Like other equity factor premiums (such as value and momentum) the source of this success is largely attributed to the persistent behavioural biases of human investors.

This consistent outperformance has, reasonably, caused some to ask whether or not they should continue to invest in equity strategies that systematically target low volatility or whether it’s time to leave the party, so to speak. Detractors will argue variously that systematic low volatility equities look expensive and interest-rate sensitive or represent an increasingly crowded investment that no longer offers the scale of risk reduction it once did. Let’s consider each of these concerns.

Low-volatility equities look expensive

Low-volatility index valuations such as the price-to-earnings ratio (the price investors are willing to pay per $1 of current earnings) and the price-to-book ratio (the price investors are willing to pay per $1 of company assets) have been on a steady upwards trajectory. The price-to-book ratio in particular, often considered a more stable measure of value than price-to-earnings, makes low-volatility equities look expensive today, relative, to other forms of equity.

Eventually, high valuations do generally end up being a headwind for equities, but in the short-to-medium term, the impact of higher valuations is much less clear, particularly in a period of economic uncertainty.

Given this uncertainty, it is important for investors to consider the role an allocation to low-volatility equities is intended to perform. We take the view that absolute outperformance is a bonus, and that the primary role for an allocation to any form of defensive equity is to provide some downside protection when the worst happens and to improve the risk-adjusted return over the long term by delivering similar returns with lower levels of absolute volatility.

Interest-rate sensitivity

Shares that feature most prominently in low-volatility equity strategies have historically been more sensitive to interest rate moves than the broader market, performing worse when interest rates rise. Central banks around the world are increasingly looking to raise interest rates and this could have a negative impact on returns for low-volatility equity strategies.

Most evidence for this relationship is based on a fairly limited sample period, in which rate-rising scenarios have coincided with positive returns for broad market equities. As a result, it is not clear whether the historical interest rate sensitivity of low-volatility equities will outweigh their defensive characteristics in periods of market stress. In fact, we suspect that, in an environment of rising rates and falling capital markets, their defensiveness may be more important as investors seek the safety of companies with stable cash flows.

Crowding

Popularity can have its problems, and the increased appeal of various factor-based equity strategies, including low-volatility equities, has some investors concerned about the potential for crowding in certain stocks. The concern is that a handful of names end up dominating portfolios and result in a liquidity squeeze and sharp price declines if these positions are suddenly sold.

Assessing this issue is difficult, as many investment funds are coy about sharing their holdings with outsiders, let alone their reasons for holding and criteria for selling; however, we can still look for some clues.

The estimated value of assets invested in low-volatility equity strategies compared with core equity strategies remains small. A qualitative assessment of the diversity of investors in some of the most prominent stocks in popular low-volatility indices suggests that the proportion of investors using a low-volatility strategy is also small. Finally, an analysis of a sample of actively managed low-volatility strategies and the extent that their investments overlap shows significant heterogeneity.

Overall, we find it difficult to conclude that crowding is a significantly greater issue for low-volatility equity strategies than it is for any other equity strategy.

Volatility reduction

The extent to which low-volatility equities have, in fact, reduced volatility relative to the broader market in recent years is less than in the past. On the surface, this supports a theory that the low-volatility anomaly is being traded away. As more people invest in these strategies, the benefit to each investor falls. The secret is out, so to speak.

As previously mentioned, however, we are skeptical that the weight of money invested in low-volatility strategies is sufficient to have such a material impact. Instead, we subscribe to a different theory.

We believe there is an element of cyclicality to the volatility reduction of low-volatility equities and that the recent trend towards less reduction is cyclical, rather than secular. Volatility has fallen generally for equity investments, and in any sort of significant downturn, we would expect low-volatility equities to exhibit less volatility than the broader market.

The conclusion

Overall, the concerns listed do not, in our view, individually or collectively undermine the case for an allocation to low-volatility equities within a diversified equity portfolio. There are clearly some potential headwinds for low-volatility equities, namely the impact of rising rates and high valuations, which may mean lower prospective returns (relative to the broader market) for these products, over the short to medium term, than many investors have become accustomed to getting.

The primary reason for allocating to defensive equity strategies such as low-volatility equities, however, is to provide diversification and improve risk-adjusted returns. Although in our view this rationale remains sound, investors could take some steps to protect their portfolios against some of the risks noted. Such precautions would include a greater use of active management and considering other types of defensive equity strategies, such as quality-bias and variable-beta approaches.

Rich Dell is global head of Mercer’s equity boutique and Ian Murray is a Mercer strategic research associate.